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Statutory changes in the United States.-Various statutes have
been passed in this country whose object is to reverse the commonlaw rule, and to allow the right of action to survive, and be
prosecuted by or against an executor or administrator. It has not
been the purpose however to include all classes of actions in this
alteration of the old law; for in sbme instances certain kinds of
actions have been expressly excepted therefrom. In addition to
this the courts have so construed others of the enabling statutes
as not to include very many kinds of actions which might appear at
first blush to be within the provisions of the statutes. Thus in
states where these statutes are in force it has been laid down that
the following classes of cases are not within their terms: viz.:
actions for libel: Walters v. Nettleton, 5 Cush. 544 ; Cummings
v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346; for malicious prosecution: i'ettleton v.
Dinehart, 5 Cush. 543; Conly v. Conl 1 , 121 Mass. 550; for
fraudulent representations whereby a party was induced to part with
his real estate: Leggate v. Moulton, 115 Mass. 552; for fraudulently recommending a person as in good credit whereby one is
induced to sell him goods on credit and lose their price: Bead v.
Hatch, 19 Pick. 47 ; Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; for fraud
and deceit in selling damaged clrn which the plaintiff fed to his
horses whereby they died: Cutting v. Tower, 14 Gray 183; for
making false answers in an examination under a trustee process:
Stillman v. H7ollenbeek, 4 Allen 391; for breach of promise of
marriage: Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. -408 ; Wade v. Kalbfleiseh,
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58 N. Y. 282; an action by a guest for injuries received through
the negligence of the landlord: Stanley v. Vogel, 9 Mo. (App.)
100. A proceeding against a stockholder of a corporation under
the Massachusetts statute for a debt of the corporation does not
survive the death of the stockholder, and the executor cannot be
made a party to such a proceeding: .Dane v. Dane ilfanufacturing
(Jo., 14 Gray 488.
Construction of " Trespass" in the*Statutes.-The New Jersey
statute on the subject saves from abatement by death actions of'
"trespass to the person or property real or personal." The word
"trespass" as used in this statute is not restricted to torts remediable by the action of trespass, but is extended by judicial construction
to mean "tort," or wrong, as in the English statute-and therefore
the effect of this statute is to give a right of action against the
representatives of a deceased wrongdoer for any injurious act of a
suable nature, without regard to the form in which the remedy is
sought. An action to recover damages caused by water being
flowed back upon the plaintiff's land from the mill dam of the
defendant: Ten Eye/c v. Bunk, 2 Yroom 428; an action against
an attorney at law for negligence and deceit in the discharge of
his duty: Tichenor v. Rayes, 12 Vroom 193; an action for
injury or neglect by a physician, Id., survive under.this statute.
But not an action for a breach of promise of marriage, for that
is founded on contract and not in tort. A similar provision
is found in a New York statute, and a similar liberal construction is given to it by the courts of that state. An action
for carelessly and negligently setting fire to and burning up grass
and fences and hay stacked upon a farm is a "1trespass" within
the New York statute: Tried v. lNew Yorc, &c., Railroad Co.,
25 How. Pr. 287. An action of deceit by a woman by which she
is led into a void marriage is an action of " trespass on the case"
within the Maine statute: Withee v. Brooks, 65 Me. 18; but an
action of breach of promise of marriage is not: Hovey v. Page,
55 Me. 142. And under a similar statute in Rhode Island it was
held that an action on the case for unlawfully erecting a large
stable so near a hotel as to become a nuisance thereto would survive: Aldrich v. Howard, 8 R. I. 125. An action against a town
for a personal injury caused by a defect in its highway is an action
of "trespass on the case" within the Maine statute: Hoover v.
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Gorhaam, 45 MAe. 212; and so is an action for a libel: -Nutting v.
Goodidge, 46 Mle. 82.
The lAtassachusetts Statute.-The Massachusetts statute (1842,
c. 89, sect. 1) declares that "the action of trespass on the case for
damage to the person shall hereafter survive, so that in the event
of the death of any person entitled to bring such action, or liable
thereto, the same may be prosecuted or defended by or against his
executor or administrator in the same manner as if he were living."
The Revision of 1882 recites the actions which survive as follows:
"In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the
following shall also survive: actions of replevin; of tort for
assault; battery; imprisonment or other damage to the person;
for goods taken and carried away or converted by defendant to his
own use; or for damage done to real or personal estate; and actions
against sheriffs for malfeasance or nonfeasance of themselves or their
deputies." This statute is specially mentioned as one where the
causes of action which are to survive the death of the party are
expressly enacted by the legislature.
Where death is instantaneous action does not survive.-Such
statute, it is held, supposes the party deceased to have been once
entitled to bring an action for the injury, and either to have commenced the action and subsequently died, or being entitled to bring
it to have died before exercising that right. Therefore where the
casualty relied on as the cause of action and the death of the party
injured are simultaneous, the right of action does not survive:
KYearney v. Boston, &c., Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 108; Mann v.
Same, Id. 108 ; Louisville, &c., Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush 522.
In Kearney v. Boston, ft., Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 108, the plaintiff's intestate was riding in a wagon across a highway, when the
wagon was struck by the cars and he was instantly killed. It was
held that the action could not be maintained. " The cause of
action," said SHAw, 0. J., "must accrue during the lifetime of the
party injured. Here there was no time during the life of the intestate at which a cause of action could accrue, because the life
closed with the accident from which a cause of action would otherwise have accrued."
The same result was reached where a girl
five years old fell from a bridge into a river below and was
drowned: Louisville, ft., Canal Co. v. Afurphy, 9 Bush 522.
But actual life or death is the test: the accruing of the right
of action does not depend upon intelligence, consciousness or men-
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tal capacity of any kind on the part of the sufferer, or on the
length of time he lives. In one case it appeared that a woman
run over by a train and killed did not speak after the accident,
though a witness saw her move her hands and feet slightly and
breathe only once. The court finding that this was only a momentary, spasmodic struggle, and that the death was instantaneous,
refused a recovery: lVann v. Boston, &e., Railroad Co., 9 Cush.
108. In another, a woman killed in a similar manner, lived from
ten to twenty hours after the accident, during which time she
breathed, swallowed and uttered sounds, and manifested signs of
life. Here the action was held to survive: Hollenbeck v. Berkshire Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 479. In another, a man struck
by a locomotive lived for fifteen minutes, though insensible all
the time. Here also the action survived: Bancroft v. Boston,
&Jc., Railroad Co., 1 Allen'34. " Time," said the court, "cannot be the test by which the right of the personal representative to
sue can be tried; nor can the absence or presence of consciousness
or sensibility be the standard. We are brought back therefore to
the only rule which can be practically applied, and that is, if the
party injured lives after an accident the right to sue accrues and
survives." In Kentucky, a druggist's clerk made a mistake in
putting up a prescription, whereby the plaintiff's intestate, who
took it according to directions, "died the same day, after enduring
great suffering and agony." The action against the druggist survived:
aiansfordv. Payne, 11 Bush 380. But in Tennessee, on
the other hand, it is held that the statute of that state makes no
distinction between the cases where the injured party lives a time
and where the death is instantaneous. ' The cause of action accrues
at the date of the injury, and is the same whether, brought by him
during life or by his personal representative after death: Powlkes
v. Nashville, &c., Railroad Co., 9 Heisk. 829; Collins v. East
Tennessee, 'e., Railroad Co., Id. 841.
What actions survive as "Damages to the Person."-The words
"damages to the person" in the Massachusetts statute are construed to include every action the substantial cause of which is a
bodily injury, whether the connection between the cause and effect
is so close as to support an action of trespass or so indirect as to
require an action on the case at common law. Therefore they
include an action against C. for selling a medicine to B., to be
administered to A., from which A. dies: Norton v. Sewall, 106
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M
'ass.
143. They therefore include actions against railroad companies for negligent personal injuries: Kearney v. Boston, J-c.,
Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 108, H ann v. Same, Id. 108; Pollenbeck v. Berkshire Railroad Co., Id. 479; Bancroft v. Boston,
sc., Railroad Co., 11 Allen 34; and against municipal corporations for injuries to the person caused by defects in the highway:
.Demond v. City of Boston, 7 Gray 544.
What actions do not survive as Damage to the Person.-On the
other hand these words do not extend to torts not directly affecting the person, but only the feelings or reputation or causing damages not of a physical character, such as libel : Walters v. tettleton,
5 Cush. 544; Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346; malicious
prosecution: Nettleton v. Dinehart, 5 Cush. 543; breach of
promise of marriage: Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. 408.
.Damage done to "Real or Personal -Estate."-Among the
actions which by the Massachusetts statute are said to survive are
actions for damages done to real or personal estate. Construing
these words the court of that state held that the causes of action
which survive by virtue of this phrase, are those the effect of which
has been to occasion injury to some specific property either personal
or real which belonged to -the deceased. They do not include
injuries to his estate generally or a mere fraud or cheat by which
he sustains a pecuniary loss. In Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass.
346, the plaintiff brought an action of libel, alleging that he had
lost a lucrative situation by reason of its publication. Before judgment the plaintiff died, and his administratrix asked to be allowed
to continue the suit as for damage done to his estate by the publication of the libel. But it was held that the action did not survive.
In Leggate v. 11Moulton, 115 Mass. 552, it was held that an action
for fraudulent representations by means of which a person was
induced to part with his real estate did not survive the death of the
plaintiff under this statute. "It is argued," said DEvEns, J., "that
within the meaning of the statute this is a damage done to the
estate of the intestate, because she was induced by the fraud of the
defendant to convey it to one who unjustly deprived her of the payment therefor. The statute was however intended to give a remedy
which should survive, only for injuries of a specific character to real
or personal estate, and not to include actions for damages for frauds
committed upon the intestate by which she might have been induced
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to part with her property at less than its value or so to conduct
herself on account of the confidence reposed by her in the party
thus deceiving her as to diminish her property. The gist of the
action is the fraud; the real estate has sustained no damage or
injury; but the fraud of the defendant induced the intestate to
part with it under circumstances which prevented her from receiving
its value." The same conclusion had been reached in the earlier
case of Bead v. Eateh, 19 Pick. 47, where the defendant, in an
action for fraudulently recommending a person as in good credit
whereby the plaintiff was induced to sell him goods on -credit and
thereby sustained damage, died before judgment. So this section
has been held to include only those cases where injury is occasioned
to property by the direct wrongful act of a party, and not where
it results incidentally or collaterally therefrom or from the doing
of some other act or the happening of some subsequent event over
which the wrongdoer had no control.
In Cutting v. Tower, 14
Gray 183, the action was for fraud and deceit in selling to the
plaintiff's intestate damaged corn, which caused the death of his
horses when given to them as food. It was held that the action
did not survive. "The gist of the action in the present case,"
said BIGELOW, J., "is the fraud and deceit practised by the defendants on the plaintiff's intestate in the sale of merchandise. For
this an action to recover damages would have laid in his favor
whether the meal which he purchased had ever been used or not;
it was not therefore the fraudulent representation of the defendants
which operated directly to the injury of any personal property. It
was the use to which the meal was put that caused the damage for
which the plaintiff now seeks to recover. But that was not the act
of the defendants. It was only a pecuniary loss resulting incidentally from the sale of the meal. Suppose the meal instead of being
used by the plaintiff's intestate to feed his horses had been made
into bread for his family, and caused great sickness and suffering
and loss of time to him and others, it would hardly be said that an
action in such case would survive for damage to the person."
But they do include injuries to specific property, the natural consequences of the tort. Therefore an action of tort against a mill-owner
who obstructs the flow of water in a stream by maintaining his dam
at too great a height,'to the injury of another mill-owner, survives the
death of the defendant: Brown v. Dean, 123 Mass. 254. So,
also, they include actions to recover specific property obtained by
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fraud. In 0-teney v. Gleason, 125 Mass. 166, the owner of a
piece of land employed a broker to sell it for him who by fraudulent representations concerning the value of another parcel of land
induced him to make a conveyance of his land to a third person,
also a party to the fraud, and to take in exchange the parcel concerning which the representations were made; this third person
afterwards conveyed the land to a purchaser in good faith, and took
a mortgage to secure a part of the purchase-money. The party
defrauded filed a bill to obtain an assignment of the mortgage and
damages, but afterwards died. It was held that the action survived to his executor. " This is not," said the court, "an action to
recover damages for a simple fraud practised upon the testator by
which he was induced to part with his property at less. than its
value. It is a suit to iecover in equity specific property or the
avails 6f specific property still held by one or more of the defendants, parties to the original fraud, and which was obtained from the
plaintiff in the abuse of a trust arising out of an existing confidential relation between him and one of the defendants as well as
damages for the breach of the trust. The liability of a trustee in
equity for a breach of duty causing damage is not terminated by
the death of the party wronged."
Other Statutory Provisions and their Construction.-Underthe
New York statute it is held that an action by a husband against a
carrier of passengers to recover for the loss of services of his wife
and for expenses paid in consequence of injuries to her person while
she was a passenger, though an action for tort, survives by virtue
of the provision preserving from abatement actions "for wrongs
done to the property, rights or interests of another," and is not
within the exception as to " actions on the case for injuries to the
person of the plaintiff:" Cregin v. .Brooklyn, &c., Railroad Co., 75
N. Y. 192. But an action for seduction is within this exception:
Holliday v. Parker, 23 Run 71; and so, as we have seen, an
action for breach of promise of marriage.
An action against a vendor of land for fraudulent representations
as to an incumbrance is within the New York statute: Haight v.
Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464; as is an action for fraudulent representations
inducing the purchase of stock: Bond v. Smith, 4 Hun 48. But
an action for breach of promise of marriage is not an action "for
wrongs done to property, rights or interests," within the New York
statute: Wade v. Kalbfleich, 58 N. Y. 282.
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The Pennsylvania statute which allows to survive "all personal
actions which the decedent * * might have commenced and prosecuted, except actions for slander, for libels and for wrongs done to
the person," includes an action for trespass for mesne "profits:
Arundel v. Springer, 71 Penn. St. 398.
In Kentucky : "No right of action for personal injury or injury
to real or personal estate shall cease or die with the person injuring
or the person injured, except actions for assault'and battery, slander,
criminal conversation, and so much of the action for malicious
prosecution as is intended to recover for the personal injury; but
for any injury other than those excepted an action may be brought
or revived by the personal representative or against the personal
representative, heir or devisee, in the same manner as causes of
action founded on contract :" Gen. Stats. Ky. 1873, cap. 10, p. 179.
An action for instigating and procuring the unlawful arrest of a
person survives under this statute after his death: Hfuggins v. Toler,'
1 Bush 192.
Under the Vermont statute an action for a "bodily hurt or
injury," survives. These words include, it is held, an action to recover damages for an unlawful arrest and imprisonment: Whitcomb v. Cook, 38 Art. 477. An action for the value of cattle
killed by a trespasser survives under the Texas statute: Ferrill v.
llfooney, 33 Tex. 219 ; and under the Ohio statute an action for
slander does not abate by the death of the plaintiff during the
pendency of the suit: Alpin v. Morton, 21 Ohio St. 536. Under
the Missouri statute (Rev. Stats. sect. 96, 97 ), actions "for all
wrongs done to the property, rights or interest of another * * except
actions for slander, libel, assault and battery or false imprisonment,
or actions on the case for injuries to the person," survive. An
action by a father against a common carrier for causing the death
of his son: James v. O]kristy, 18 Mo. 162; by a woman fraudulently induced to marry a man already married, for the value of her
services while living with him as his wife: Higgins v. Breen, 9
M o. 497, are held to survive under this statute. But an action
by a-guest against a hotel-keeper for injuries received through an
unguarded opening in the hotel is held not to sound in contract
and not to survive: Stanley v. Vogel, 9 Mo. (App.) 100.
The Iowa statute of 1851 provided that no -actions should abate
by death if, "from the nature of the case, the cause of action can
survive or continue." Under this statute it was held that an

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.

action of libel (Carson v. ifcfadden, 10 Iowa 91) and an action
for assault and battery did not abate: JIcKinlay v. McGregor, 10
Iowa 111. Subsequently in 1862, the legislature amended the
foregoing section by adding the word "legal," making it read, " if
from the legal nature of the case the cause of action can survive or
continue.". In S'hafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550; the question
arose whether an action of seduction would survive under this
statute and it was argued that, "legal nature of the case," meant
if the action survived at common law, and as the action did not
survive at common law it could not survive under the statute. But
the court refused to so construe the statute. " This construction,"
said DILLON, 0. J., "practically makes the section a felo de se.
With this construction the section would mean simply this, ' actions
do not abate by death, if at common law they survive;' of course
they would not, and the section would be useless." The court held
that this word was intended to refer to causes of action wnose legal
nature is such that they cannot survive, as for example, suits for
divorce (O'ffagan v. O'JHagan,4 Iowa 509); for dower (Betts v.
Mlatthews, 4 Harr. 427); or for other rights necessarily dependent
upon the existence of the person.
-Effect of Appeals and Reversals-Practice.-Theaction only
abates where a party dies before judgment: Gibbs v. Belcher, 30
Tex. 80; Cox v. Whitfield, 18 Ala. 738; Taney v. Edwards, 26
Tex. 224; Long v. HitLcocc, 3 Ohio 274; and therefore when
judgment has been obtained on a cause of action which would not
survive the death of a party, the judgment does not abate by reason
of a subsequent death: Id. But an award of arbitrators is not ao
"judgment" within this rule, even where the statute provides that
an award of arbitrators shall have the effect of a judgment, and be
a lien on real estate: Miller v. Umbehower, 10 S. & R. 31.
Where a final judgment in a personal action is rendered against
a defendant, and he sues out a writ of error, but dies before errors
are assigned, the writ does not abate, but his administrator may
prosecute it. "The proceeding," it is said, "becomes a new action.
The defendant below becomes the actor here, and the original cause
of action has become merged in the judgment to reverse which is
the object of the present action. If then the judgment which is
complained of as erioneous survives, the cause of action as to the
writ of error survives :" Cox v. Whitfield, 18 Ala. 738; contra,
Long v. Hitehcoc , 3 Ohio 274. The rule is the same where the
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plaintiff dies pending the appeal by the defendant, but after judgment against him: Gibbs v. Belcher, 30 Tex. 80, overruling
Taney v. E dwards, 27 Id. 225; Kimbrough v. Mitchell, 1 Head.
539; Thompson v. Central Railroad Co., 60 Ga. 120. But according'to the American practice where a judgment in a personal
action which does not survive is obtained before the death of the
defendant who dies pending the appeal by him, if the judgment is
reversed by the appellate court, the action abates: Cox v. Whitfield, 18 Ala..738 ; Harrisonv. oseley, 31 Tex. 608; Benjamin
v. Smith, 17 Wend. 208.
In England, when the plaintiff dies after verdict, the court, in
granting a now trial on the application of the defendant, will impose
terms on him to prevent his taking advantage of the plaintiff's
death-as that the verdict if obtained again shall be entered as of
the time when the case was first tried: Griffith v. Williams, 1
Cromp. & J. 47; Palmer v. Cohen, 2 B. & Ad. 966. This very
just practice does not appear to be followed in this country. But
it has been held in Massachusetts that where the death occurs after
verdict, delay during the time taken for the argument of law questions on which its validity depends or for advisement thereon will not
be allowed to deprive a party of its benefits, and where a party dies
after verdict judgment will be entered nunc pro tune as of the day of
the verdict: Keiley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 341 ; Twyeross v. Grant,
27 W. R. 87. And the stipulation of counsel, as a condition of putting the case over a circuit, that in'case of the death of the plaintiff before final judgment and determination of the action, the
,cause of action should survive, will be enforced by the court: Ames
v. Webbers, 10 Wend. 576 ; s. a. 11 Id. 186. And such a stipulation
will continue in force until final judgment, although, in the meanwhile a verdict and judgment in the plaintiff's favor had been set
aside on appeal: Cox v. New York, &c., Railroad Co., 63 N. Y.
414. Under the New York Code death after verdict does not cause
the action to abate: Wood v. Phillips,11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 1; though
before this statute a personal action did not survive if a party died
before final judgment: 1ilore v. Bennett, 65 Barb. 338 ; .reland v.
Champneys, 4 Taunt. 885.
Both natural death and civil death (i. e. imprisonment in the
penitentiary for life) abate actions for personal injury: -Freemanv.
Frank, 10 Abb. Pr. 371.
The question whether a cause of action survives may be raised

